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is possible depends on his being able to refute the idea that "exist" is not a 
descriptive predicate, but he devotes only about a page to refuting this com-
mon idea (p. 19). His strategy is to claim that "exist" seems descriptive when 
the grammatical subject is a proper name and that the burden of proof is on 
his opponent to show that "exist" has a different meaning when the grammat-
ical subject is a common noun. But when we consider the point of saying 
"Ronald Reagan exists" (his example), we may well conclude that "exist" 
here does make a different point (have a different meaning) than it does in 
"Cows exist." Frequently his argument turns on undefended claims about 
what is better and on assumptions about what is logically possible. He asserts 
that God is greater if it is logically impossible for any being to come close 
to God in the number and degree of its perfections (p. 24). (To counter the 
claim that God is greater if God could create such a being, he replies that 
doing so would lessen God's perfection. It is not obvious to me that this is 
so. I wonder too how one individuates God's perfections.) His argument in 
Chapter 4 depends on defining a number of artificial concepts; I suspect that 
Dore's opponent would doubt the logical possibility of these concepts, but 
Dore never considers this problem. Certainly, my asking these questions does 
not show that Dore is wrong in any of these claims, but I do think it shows 
that he might well have devoted more attention to their defense. 
The Specter of the Absurd, by Donald A. Crosby. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1988. Pp. IX and 456, $59.50 (cloth), $19.95 (paper). 
LOUIS DUPRE, Yale University 
This insightful, balanced, and clearly written study of the intellectual sources 
of modern nihilism stands out by the width of its range. In the first part the 
author distinguishes no less than five different types of nihilism. Political 
nihilism began in the revolutionary societies of mid-nineteenth century Rus-
sia; moral nihilism rejects all moral principles or denies that they can be 
rationally justified; epistemological nihilism either relativizes truth claims or 
denies even commonality of meaning among different cultures; cosmic nihil-
ism assumes the cosmos to be devoid of intrinsic intelligibility or at least of 
human value; to existential nihilism, the most fundamental and in common 
usage often the only known type, human existence itself appears absurd. All 
of these varieties are duly illustrated by texts taken from representative phil-
osophical or literary sources. Obviously, then, this study extends the limits 
of its subject well beyond the traditional definition. By more conventional 
standards most of what the author describes as epistemological nihilism and 
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much of what he regards as cosmic or even as moral nihilism would be 
reckoned to be causes or sources of the phenomenon rather than part of its 
essence. The author himself has not completely abandoned the traditional 
view, since some of what in the second part passes for "arguments" conducive 
to nihilism reappears later in the guise of philosophical "sources" and, indeed, 
partly coincides with what the first part had described as the essence of 
"epistemological nihilism" itself. 
However we choose to define it, we all agree that nihilism is a modern 
phenomenon that only in the last century fully surfaced. Not surprisingly, 
then, its justification is all to be found in the intellectual baggage of modern 
culture: the eclipse of the belief in God, a relation to nature dominated by 
the objectivist view of the scientific revolution, the absolute priority of the 
human spirit, an unprecedented demand for absolute cognitive certainty, an 
individualist concept of human associations. In contrast to the exclusively 
modem character of the arguments, the "religious sources" of nihilism, dis-
cussed in part III, extend in part to the origins of the Christian and indeed of 
the theistic worldview. According to Crosby, they created certain conditions 
without which modern nihilism would never have emerged in the form it did. 
Nevertheless, the questionable assumptions that came with the Christian cul-
ture, such as that of an anthropocentric universe in which nature functions as 
a servant to human interests, or of value exclusively derived from a transcen-
dent source, had no nihilistic impact until they became mixed with different, 
more modern and more explosive ones. From those "religious" sources, the 
author distinguishes what he calls the "philosophical" ones. Among them we 
find, in one form or another, all the assumptions characteristic of modern 
epistemology-subjectivism, objectivism, scientism, as well as the ideologies 
that have determined the political and moral theories of the last three centu-
ries-individualism, separation between fact and value, absolute voluntarism. 
In this part we find some of the author's most perceptive insights, especially 
in the tenth and eighth chapters devoted respectively to modern moral and 
political theories, and to the seeds of nihilism in Descartes' thought. Through-
out Donald Crosby proves to be a knowledgeable and reliable guide in the 
complexities of modern philosophy in general, and of some individual figures 
in particular-I would single out Sartre, Monod, Mill, and Schopenhauer. On 
the other hand, I find it hard to recognize Hegel or any of the German idealists 
in the "subjectivist" picture here drawn of them. 
A more substantial target of criticism, however, in this otherwise excellent 
study are the repetitions and omissions. The author's somewhat idiosyncratic 
division of his subject into types, arguments, and two kinds of sources has 
resulted in a great deal of overlapping. This structural defect would remain 
a minor imperfection had it not affected the readability and, above all, the 
intellectual focus of the study. As ever subtler distinctions attempt to bring 
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order to a subject that continues to expand beyond definable limits, the reader 
finds him/herself wondering: What, then, in the end is nihilism itselfl Is it 
no more than the sum total of those loosely connected currents in modern 
thought which together have created the crisis to which we vaguely refer as 
"the modern predicament?" Too much in the discussion of modern philosophy 
receives undeserved attention, forcing the reader to cover, often more than 
once, all too familiar territory without precisely knowing where it will lead 
him or her. (This too scrupulously scholastic approach may, however, en-
hance the book's qualifications for classroom adoption!) Moreover, has the 
author been sufficiently critical in granting a central place to thinkers because 
of their frequent reference to the term nihilism? Nietzsche, largely responsible 
for the philosophical popularity of the term, regarded nihilism as the outcome 
of, and the major threat to, Western culture which his own work meant to 
overcome. Yet here he appears as one of its main representatives. I should 
hasten to add that this paradox is not of the author's own making. He dis-
tinguishes the "passive," cultural nihilism which Nietzsche combats from his 
own "active" one. Yet the terminological confusion created by the dual role 
is neither analyzed nor resolved. Even Sartre's place of honor in this work 
made me wonder whether his insistence on the "annihilating" quality of the 
mind has not too hastily been associated with "nihilism" proper. The answer 
to those critical questions remains uncertain, because the very comprehensive 
definition of the subject justifies the prominent presence of both Nietzsche 
and Sartre. What leaves me in no doubt, however, is the significance of one 
omission. Crosby mentions but fails to discuss Heidegger, the only modern 
thinker who has probed the metaphysical significance of nihilism. This ab-
sence confirms the impression that, despite his solid and perceptive acquaint-
ance with modern philosophy, the author nevertheless tends to shy away from 
a strictly metaphysical reflection on his subject. In general, he prefers to stay 
with epistemological issues and their moral and existential consequences. But 
in choosing this approach he remains within that subjectivist perspective 
which lies at the root of modern nihilism and, by his own account, partly 
coincides with it. It would be ungenerous to criticize a book that gives so 
much for refusing to give more. Instead we ought to feel grateful to the author 
for having provided us with the intellectual material needed for a metaphys-
ical reflection. Professor Crosby's book deserved better editorial care than it 
received from its publishers. It contains many printing errors (e.g., 
Descartes', Hobbe' s, Schopehnauer-all of them repeatedly) and, at least on 
my copy, the cover is bound upside down. 
